A Prevention and a Traction System for Ransomware Attacks by Ozer, Murat et al.
IEEE Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IEEE
Personal use of this material is permitted. Per-
mission from IEEE must be obtained for all other
uses, in any current or future media, including
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising
or promotional purposes, creating new collective
works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists,
or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work
in other works.
Accepted to be published in:
6th Annual Conf. on Computational Science &
Computational Intelligence (CSCI’19); Dec 05-07,
2019; Las Vegas, Nevada, USA;
https://american-cse.org/csci2019/#!/home
DOI 10.1109/CSCI49370.2019.00032
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
02
28
2v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
7 M
ar 
20
20
A Prevention and a Traction System for
Ransomware Attacks
Murat Ozer
School of Information Technology
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
ozermm@ucmail.uc.edu
Said Varlioglu
School of Information Technology
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
varlioms@mail.uc.edu
Bilal Gonen
School of Information Technology
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
bilal.gonen@uc.edu
Mehmet F. Bastug
Department of Interdisciplinary Studies
Lakehead University
Orillia, Ontario, CA
mbastug@lakeheadu.ca
Abstract—Over the past three years, especially following Wan-
naCry malware, ransomware has become one of the biggest
concerns for private businesses, state, and local government
agencies. According to Homeland Security statistics, 1.5 million
ransomware attacks have occurred per year since 2016. Cyber-
criminals often use creative methods to inject their malware
into the target machines and use sophisticated cryptographic
techniques to hold hostage victims’ files and programs unless
a certain amount of equivalent Bitcoin is paid. The return to
the cybercriminals is so high (estimated $1 billion in 2019)
without any cost because of the advanced anonymity provided by
cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin [1]. Given this context, this
study first discusses the current state of ransomware, detection,
and prevention systems. Second, we propose a global ransomware
center to better manage our concerted efforts against cybercrim-
inals. The policy implications of the proposed study are discussed
in the conclusion section.1
Index Terms—ransomware, traction, blockchain, cryptocur-
rency
I. INTRODUCTION
Ransomware has been continuing to be a lucrative business
for cybercriminals around the world. In 2019, many cities in
the United States reported devastating ransomware attacks, as
displayed in Figure 1 [2]. By 2021, experts estimate $6 trillion
ransomware related damages globally [3]. In the US, cyber-
attacks are the fastest growing crime, which becomes more
sophisticated and costly to victims, including big companies.
The history of ransomware attacks begins with the invention
of the Web in 1989. The first attack spread via floppy disk,
which was requesting $189 sent to a Panama post office. FBI
arrested Ohio native perpetrator of the attack in a relatively
short time because the form of the attack was simple, little
or no anonymity was available, and less people had access to
the internet at that time. Today, we have more than 1.2 billion
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Fig. 1. A Map of reported US ransomware attacks in 2019 by Armor [4]
websites with 3.8 billion internet users, and it is expected that
we will reach 6 billion internet users by 2022.
In addition to the websites, the number of Internet of
Things (IoT) devices has been increasing exponentially and
expected to reach 200 billion by 2020 [5]. Putting it differ-
ently, today, cybercriminals may find more security deficits
through wirelessly connected devices, which may include, but
not limited to, smart home systems, pacemakers, and brain
neurostimulators.
Moreover, recent cyberattacks such as WannaCry and Not-
Petya revealed that criminals use more sophisticated tech-
niques and encryption algorithms, which make it impossible
to revert the data into its original format unless paying
criminals via a cryptocurrency (mostly Bitcoin) and receiving
a decryption key [6].
The ransomware process starts with injecting malware into
the networked computer by targeting human or technical
weaknesses. Human related weaknesses usually stem from
opening and clicking spam messages, which are also called
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Fig. 2. How Ransomware Works
phishing emails. Technical weaknesses may contain many
different factors ranging from using publicly accessible Wi-Fi
networks to a lack of firewall protection. After the infection
process, as seen in Figure 2, cybercriminals change the file
system by encrypting the whole computer files and allow a
victim to see only their message and Bitcoin payment process.
When cybercriminals hack a computer, it is nearly impossible
to decrypt the files unless having the decryption algorithm
or a decryption key. For this reason, victims tend to pay to
cybercriminals to restore their hostage data from the criminals
[7].
There is a high debate not to pay cybercriminals for their
ransomware attacks [6]; however, the end results of the cyber-
attack can be much more devastating than the ransom amount
due to the time-sensitive data such as health care data. For this
reason, even FBI sometimes suggests paying back to criminals
to restore the data [8]. For instance, Baltimore city had fallen
victim to a ransomware attack in 2019 and residents were even
not able to perform basic payments. For this reason, Baltimore
officials voted to transfer $6 million worth of Bitcoin to
cybercriminals to back to normality [7]. However, paying the
ransom amount does not always guarantee to have the data
back because the success rate of getting the decryption key
from the cybercriminals is only 47%.
Furthermore, even though a decryption key is provided
as a result of the payment, not all files can be completely
restored as experienced in the Baltimore case. For this reason,
ransomware detection, and preventive software and techniques
are vastly discussed in the literature.
II. RELATED WORKS
Researchers have developed different systems to identify
and prevent ransomware attacks. For instance, Scaife et al. [9]
developed the CryptoDrop system, which basically scans the
file system against suspicious activity. If CryptoDrop detects
an abnormality, the software triggers and stops ransomware
from executing the rest of the malware code to encrypt the
files. In this way, the researchers state that their system can
stop ransomware as little as losing 10 files out of 5100.
Similarly, Kharraz et al. [10] analyzed the anatomy of the
ransomware attacks and discovered that even sophisticated ran-
somware attacks could be stopped after detecting abnormality
in the file system activity.
Continella et al. [11] developed the ShieldFS system, which
analyzes low-level filesystem activity to create a benchmark-
ing filesystem from many different benign applications (like
analyzing billions of low-level file activity). If the ShieldFS
detects a malicious activity compared to benign ones, it
immediately recovers all of the original files.
Kolodenker et al. [12] proposed a different light-weight
system called PayBreak. This method created a symmetric
session to imitate ransomware encryption keys so that victims
can later use these copied symmetric keys to restore their
files back without paying to the attacker. Further analysis
showed that PayBreak could successfully decrypt files from
twelve ransomware families. There are 30 known ransomware
families. The authors assert that PayBreak adds negligible
performance overhead to the computer processor, which in
turn makes it preferable to run it all the time.
Gomez-Hernandez et al. [13] offered a practical and easy
solution (called R-Locker) by deploying a set of honeyfiles
to the target environment. In this way, when the ransomware
reads one of these files, it is automatically blocked.
III. CURRENT STUDY
The methods and software discussed in these studies usually
require additional tools installed on the target system of
users. However, most users do not install these tools on their
computers unless they come as built-in. Even though detection
systems are provided at the beginning, users fail to update the
security patches on time, which again opens back doors to
cybercriminals. For this reason, in addition to the advanced
detection systems, we need to increase user-level ransomware
awareness by promoting training against malicious activities
such as phishing emails and visiting non-secure websites. On
the other hand, more measures are needed at the agency level
including strong firewall, file back-up system, email filtering
service, two-factor authentication, and on-time system updates.
Our study discusses that although detection and prevention
systems harden the system vulnerabilities against ransomware
attacks, it is nearly impossible to completely prevent these
attacks because of the never-ending fight between good and
bad actors, as is the case in every field of the life. For this
reason, in addition to the detection and prevention systems, we
need to create and maintain a concerted effort that tracks ran-
somware attacks to its originated person/group and location.
As discussed above, a fair number of victims, including gov-
ernment organizations, tend to pay the ransomware. However,
we know little about many of these victims since more than
50% of ransomware targets small to mid-size governmental
agencies or companies which, most of the time, stay private
unless a data breach policy forces them to declare it to the
public [7].
Given this context, this study discusses a joint effort to
track Bitcoin transactions until cashed-out Bitcoin addresses.
Cybercriminals prefer Bitcoin transactions because it provides
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anonymity which makes nearly impossible to identify the iden-
tity of the target person. In addition to this, Bitcoin transactions
are irrefutable, which basically guarantee not canceling or
reversing the payment. Even though Bitcoin transactions main-
tain anonymity for both a sender and a receiver, it normally
provides a pseudonym rather than anonymity thanks to the
public ledger of the Blockchain. That means further analysis
may identify the person that hides behind the walls of Bitcoin
for their ransomware attacks. Tracing Bitcoin transactions back
to the originated person/group or location is not easy but not
impossible, as well.
Therefore, the proposed study offers two techniques to
uncover Bitcoin transactions. First, there are many empirical
studies in the information technology area that discuss tech-
niques to reduce the anonymity of bitcoin transactions [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [1].
We will test these techniques against the public ledger of
bitcoin transactions to unravel the anonymous nature of the
bitcoin public keys. Each proposed technique from different
peer-reviewed journals will be evaluated, and promising results
will be pooled in a combined technique to de-anonymize
ransomware related bitcoin transactions. Even though the
complete de-anonymization might not be possible in certain
cases, we will identify private keys by using a confidence
interval. Thus, each transaction will have a score that reflects
that confidence interval. The practical implementation of using
confidence intervals will help the classification of the identified
data into strata that facilitate evidence identification (e.g., a
transaction belongs to a certain person with 90% confidence).
Second, our model proposes using open sources to col-
lect intelligence towards the identification of private bitcoin
addresses, using sophisticated analytical tools (e.g., one-to-
many mapping, link/graph analysis, clustering/pattern analysis,
because criminals often leave digital footprints that help to
detect their identity). For instance, in dark web forums, a
person sends a message to a buyer to request the money
(cryptocurrency) to his bitcoin address. We will aggregate
this information and use pattern and keyword matching to
identify the account holder’s name, IP address, and location
using various open-source data including social media. Once
the bitcoin address is attached to a person, we will house
that information in a separate database that holds blacklisted
bitcoin addresses. As displayed in Figure 3, our model consists
of ten steps:
1) Method-1: Test proposed algorithms by researchers to
de-anonymize Bitcoin transactions used in ransomware
attacks
2) Method-2: Identify ransomware related Bitcoin ad-
dresses and track the incoming and outgoing traffic as
explained in Paquet-Clouston et al.’s study [1].
3) Method-3: Analyze for abnormalities in Bitcoin prices
in order to detect likely ransomware transactions as
explained in Jareth’s study [22]
4) Method-4: Automatically check real-time transactions to
capture Bitcoin addresses used in previous ransomware
attacks
Fig. 3. Model Workflow
5) Server-1: Monitor Bitcoin Ledger
6) Server-2: Blacklisted Bitcoin data analysis
7) Action-1: Open Source analysis through automated
scans to find pseudonyms of ransomware related Bitcoin
addresses
8) Action-2: Analytical analysis (link analysis) that con-
stantly augments de-anonymization by associating pre-
viously unlinked Bitcoin addresses
9) Action-3: Manual data entry from different users/victims
to increase de-anonymization process
10) Action-4: Constant feedback from the field to evolve the
accuracy of the system
In addition to this, there are many websites that pub-
lish the wallet IDs of bitcoin addresses. For instance,
www.walletexplorer.com shares wallet IDs even for dark web
websites. This is a wealth of information that provides leverage
for researchers and investigators to detect criminal cryptocur-
rency transactions [23].
We will download disparate blacklisted bitcoin transactions
into a platform (Server 2 in Figure 3) to build an algorithm
that will link unconnected bitcoin transactions to one another
in order to better understand these relationships in a mapped
network. For this purpose, we will employ the principles of
graph/link analysis that easily link related bitcoin addresses
to each other as well as dark web websites [15]. The next
step will be de-anonymizing blacklisted bitcoin addresses (e.g.,
who the person is, where the person is located) with open-
source intelligence analysis, as explained above. The reason
for using link analysis is that once we identify a chain/node in
the network, we can better predict the other related unidentified
bitcoin addresses. Putting it differently, when we identify
a node and its related links, the anonymity of the Bitcoin
addresses diminishes towards pseudonyms (i.e., wallet-id) and
later to real identities through using open sources because
even hackers or related associates leave some footprints on the
internet [21]. Using a similar strategy proposed in the current
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study, US Department of Justice was able to track and indict
two Iranian men responsible for the SamSam ransomware
attacks in different cities of Atlanta, Newark, New Jersey,
the Port of San Diego, and Hollywood Presbyterian Medical
Center in Los Angeles [8]
Finally, our study offers to have a global center to better
collect ransomware information, which helps to prevent better
strategies. As discussed above, not all ransomware attacks
are reported to FBI; therefore, we are not able to collect
all ransomware cases which contain valuable information
such as infection style, deployed encryption family of the
ransomware, and Bitcoin address(es). In addition to this, as
Dudley and Kao [8] mentioned, there are many known cases
that victims hired data recovery companies; however, those
companies just paid back to cybercriminals to restore the data
and never told the victims and the law enforcement officials
about the case. For this reason, as the literature discusses to
train users against cyber-attacks, this study also encourages
to train victims to immediately share their cyber-attacks with
the proposed ransomware center that collects the timely and
necessary information to cope with the cybercriminals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ransomware epidemic continues to spread due to its
lucrative business. Increased digital activities, internet users,
and the Internet of Things (IoT) devices create more vulner-
abilities to cybercriminals, which require advanced detection,
prevention, and tracking systems to deter likely cybercrimi-
nals. This study discussed that although researchers developed
effective detection and prevention systems, many of them
require installing those tools to the target machines, which
always remain the possibility that some computers and systems
may not have the required tools installed or updated. In
addition to this, as cybersecurity personnel updates themselves
against cyber-attacks, cybercriminals also try to invent new
techniques to open back doors for their criminal activities.
This study discusses that the realistic approach to ran-
somware attacks is that we will always experience a certain
level of attacks regardless of having advanced detection and
prevention systems. For this reason, in addition to the detection
and prevention systems, this study proposes to create a global
ransomware center that collects as much as possible data
to develop adequate methods against cybercriminals and to
identify individuals/groups behind these attacks.
In the United States, FBI tries to play a central role in
investigating ransomware attacks. However, the FBI usually
keeps the attack details private and mostly does not share
with researchers to conduct further analyses to develop bet-
ter coping strategies against ransomware attacks. Our study
proposes that academia, researchers, and law enforcement
should work together around a global center because recent
ransomware statistics suggests that ransomware is a global
issue and threats/harms wide range of victim profiles ranging
from daily internet users to sick and injured people waiting
services at health-care agencies. For this reason, rather than
mere law enforcement efforts, concerted efforts are needed
around a global ransomware prevention and traction center
to truly cope with ransomware attacks/threats which we are
currently experiencing and will continue to experience in the
future.
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